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China’s exports have become increasingly sophisticated. This has generated anxiety 
in both developed and developing countries as the competitive pressure from Chinese 
firms may be increasingly felt outside labor-intensive industries. This paper 
investigates the contributing factors to the rising export sophistication. The paper is a 
part of ICRIER’s ongoing effort to focus on the Chinese economic development and 
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China’s exports have become increasingly sophisticated. This has generated anxiety 
in developed countries as the competitive pressure may be increasingly felt outside 
labor-intensive industries.  Using product-level data on exports from different cities 
within China, this paper investigates the contributing factors to the rising export 
sophistication. Somewhat surprisingly, neither processing trade nor foreign invested 
firms are found to play an important role in generating the increased overlap in the 
export structure between China and high-income countries. Instead, improvement in 
human capital and government policies in the form of tax-favored high-tech zones 
appear to be the key in the country’s evolving export structure. On the other hand, 
processing trade, foreign invested firms, and government-sponsored high-tech zones 
all have contributed significantly to raising the unit values of China’s exports within a 
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The Chinese Export Bundles: Patterns, Puzzles and Possible 
Explanations 
 
Zhi Wang and Shang-Jin Wei
* 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
Both China and India are major success stories in their integration with the world 
economy, and in their fast economic growth rates. At this stage, China’s goods 
exports are somewhat ahead of India’s. China’s exports in 2007 were valued at $1,218 
billion according to statistics released by China’s Ministry of Commerce, more than 
seven times India’s estimated $155 billion in exports in the same year (IMF, “India: 
2007 Article IV Consultation-Staff Report”). On the other hand, India has been more 
successful in exports of business services and of information and IT services. 
 
China exports a huge variety of goods in a way that makes the composition of its 
export bundles looks increasingly similar to that of rich country bundles. This has 
been documented by Schott (2005), Rodrik (2006), Xu (2007), and Fontagne, Gaulier 
and Zignago (2007), and is perhaps surprising to many. Using data on Chinese 
exports at the level of product-producing region-customs type, Wang and Wei (2008) 
investigated possible reasons behind the apparent rise in the sophistication of Chinese 
exports.  
 
The current paper has two objectives. First, it collects new product-level data on 
Indian exports and compares the evolution of export sophistication for both China and 
India. Second, it summarizes the key findings of Wang and Wei (2008). Because we 
do not have comparably detailed data for Indian exports as we do for China, we are 
not able to replicate all of the analyses performed in Wang and Wei (2008). 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 documents the evolving export 
structure sophistication for both China and India. Section 3 explains the basic 
methodology, the underlying data, and the statistical analyses of Chinese exports. 
Section 4 concludes. 
 




To keep track of export sophistication, we adopt the methodology developed in Schott 
(2005) by comparing the export structure of each country in question with those of the 
high-income industrial economies. Specifically, we use as a benchmark the collective 
export structure of the United States, Japan and the European Union, which we will 
heretofore call the G-3 for short. The G-3 economies, on an ex ante basis, have a 
comparative advantage in producing and exporting the most skill-intensive products. 
                                                 
* The views in the paper are those of the authors and not the official views of the US ITC, or any other 
organization that the authors are or have been affiliated with. The authors thank Kyle Caswell and 
Chang Hong for their efficient research assistance, and Xuepeng Liu, William Power, participants of 




Therefore, similarity in export structure to these economies is taken as a measure of 
export sophistication. By implication, if India and China’s export structures become 
more similar to those of the G-3 economies over time, this should be taken as 
evidence that their exports have become increasingly more sophisticated.  
 
This methodology allows us to avoid having to make a judgment on products’ skill 
content, product by product. Since G-3 economies adjust their export structures over 
time in response to their evolving comparative advantage (and to competition from 
the rest of the world) the benchmark of the G-3 export structure is a moving target. In 
other words, there is no presumption that any developing country’s export structure 
should automatically converge to those of the G-3 economies over time. 
 
This definition of export sophistication has its drawbacks. First, even when China and 
India export the same type of product as do the high-income countries, they may not 
be producing the same variety within a given product category. Using unit value 
within a product category as a yardstick for the sophistication level of a variety, 
Schott (2006) and Wang and Wei (2008) confirm that the Chinese varieties tend to 
have lower unit values than those exported by the G-3 economies. Moreover, Wang 
and Wei (2008) showed that unit values tend to vary systematically across production 
by Chinese exporters. Private Chinese firms tend to produce the lowest unit values. 
Foreign-invested firms that engage in processing exports, and that are located in high-
tech development zones, tend to produce the highest unit values. Second, half of 
Chinese exports are from processing trade, which could muddle the sophistication 
content of Chinese exports. Taking into account the role of processing exports, 
Koopman, Wang and Wei (2008) calculate that, on average, domestic value added as 
a share of Chinese exports is about 50%. Moreover, those sectors that are likely to be 
labeled as technically sophisticated, such as computers and telecommunications, tend 
to have even lower domestic content, on the order of 20% or less. These caveats about 
using export structure to judge a country’s export sophistication should be kept in 
mind while interpreting subsequent results. 
 
A Preliminary Look at Export Structure Sophistication 
 
We now start with a check on the sophistication of Chinese and Indian exports.  The 
most detailed way to classify a country’s exports while maintaining international 
comparability is to use the Harmonized System at the 6-digit level. With this 
classification, a country can export slightly over 5000 products. Figure 1 plots the 
fraction of HS 6-digit level products that the G-3 economies export but that China (or 
India) does not over the period from 1996-2005. By this metric, only 2-3% of all 
product lines fall into category for Chinese exports. In other words, there is very little 
difference in export bundles between China and the G-3 economies: China exports 
virtually all the things that the G-3 economies do. For India, the gap is somewhat 
more visible. In 1996, close to 10% of product lines that the G-3 exported were not 
also exported by India. The gap has shrunk over time, however, to about 3% by 2005. 
 
We can also look at the flip side of the story, that is, the fraction of product lines that 
China or India exports but the G-3 economies do not. By this measure, overlap in the 
export bundles of China and the G-3 is astonishingly high. The overlap between India 
and the G-3 is only slightly less so but also very high (These results are left out to 
save space). From these admittedly naïve measures, one might think that China and 


















moving fast in that direction. India is not doing so yet, but is following in China’s 
path with a lag of roughly ten years. 
 
Figure 1:  Fraction of the HS-6 Codes that the G3 Export but that  

















This method suffers from one serious drawback, in that it only ticks off whether any 
particular good is exported or not. Since both China and India are large economies, 
they may export virtually all products, but for some product lines, only by a tiny bit. If 
China and India are more likely to export those relatively sophisticated products in 
only a trivial amount, this metric may exaggerate the degree of overlap in export 
bundles. As a refinement, we apply some cutoff level to the value of exports before it 
is deemed significant. We choose $1 million as our cutoff point. Specifically, we now 
look at the fraction of goods that G-3 export (in an amount of at least $1 million) but 
that China or India does not. The results are represented in Figure 2. As we can see, 
this number was 29% in 1996, and declined more or less steadily to 14% in 2005. The 
line for India also traces out a steady decline in the part of exports that does not 
overlap with that of the G-3 economies, from about 65% in 1995 to about 40% in 
2005. Note the degree to which India’s area of no overlap in 2005 was bigger than 
that for China in 1995. This suggests that India still has some catching up to do in the 
development of its exports’ sophistication. 
 
Figure 2:  Fraction of the HS-6 Codes that G-3 Economies Export by at  
















Source: Authors’ calculations based on official trade statistics from the China Customs 
Administration and UN COMTRADE data.  
 
4
Rather than assigning equal weight to all products, one may assign a greater weight to 
products whose export values are greater. The results of this operation are presented 
in Figure 3. A pattern broadly similar to those shown above can be seen in this figure. 
 
Figure 3:  Value-weighted Fraction of HS-6 Codes that G-3 Economies Export by 


















Rather than applying a blunt cutoff point such as that employed in Figures 2 and 3, we 
could explicitly take into account the share of each product in the export bundle. We 
do this later in the paper by constructing and analyzing an Export Dissimilarity Index 
(EDI). We note here, simply, that we arrive at broadly the same conclusions
1.  
 
A Formal Index of Export Structure Dissimilarity 
 
We define an index for a lack of sophistication in exports by the dissimilarity between 
the product structure of a region’s exports and that of the G-3 economies’ exports, or 
the export dissimilarity index (EDI) as: 
 




irft rft s s abs =   EDI ∑ −         (2) 
where   
 
           ( 3 )  
 
 
Where sirft is the share of HS product i at the 6-digit level in Chinese city r’s exports 
by firm type f in year t, and s
ref
i,t is the share of HS product i in the 6-digit level 
                                                 
1 Xu (2007) noted that the unit values of China’s exports tend to be lower than those of the same 
products from rich countries, indicating China’s varieties are of lower quality and presumably of 
lesser sophistication. Fontagne, Gaulier and Zignago (2007, Tables 1 and 2) show that China’s export 
structure, defined as in Schott (2006) but at the HS 6-digit level, is more similar to those of Japan, 
the United States, and the European Union than to those of Brazil and Russia. However, judged on 
unit values, Chinese exports are more likely to be on the low end of the market than are those of the 























exports of G-3 developed countries. The greater the value of the index, the more 
dissimilar the two export structures are. If the two export structures were to be 
identical, then the value of the index would be zero; if the two export structures were 
to have no overlap, then the index would take the value of 200. We regard an export 
structure as more sophisticated if the index takes a smaller value. Alternatively, one 
could use the similarity index proposed by Finger and Kreinin (1979) and used by 
Schott (2006) (except for the scale): 
 
ESIrft = 100∑i min(sirft , s
ref
it,)         (4) 
 
This index is bounded by zero and 100. If Chinese city r’s export structure has no 
overlap with that of the G-3 developed countries, then the ESI is zero; if the two 
export structures have a perfect overlap, then the index takes the value of 100.  It can 
be verified that there is a one-to-one, linear mapping between ESI and EDI : 
 
ESIrft = (200 - EDIrft)/2         (5) 
 
While ESI and EDI are linearly related, log ESI and log EDI not linearly related. 
Wang and Wei (2008) show that in regressions, the sign of the coefficients associated 
with log EDI is more robust to small changes in specification than is log ESI. 
Therefore, we regard inferences drawn from log ESI as more reliable. 
 































































1997 4,143  4,063  4,123  3,042 26.2  12.3  132.5 
1998 4,143  4,046  4,121  3,041 26.2  12.3  130.8 
1999 4,143  4,061  4,120  3,024 26.6  10.8  129.2 
2000 4,143  4,059  4,116  3,172  22.9  8.8  125.5 
2001 4,143  4,068  4,118  3,184  22.7  9.6  124.8 
2002 4,213  4,135  4,184  3,306 21.0  10.5  125.4 
2003 4,213  4,125  4,182  3,408  18.5  7.2  126.1 
2004 4,213  4,126  4,186  3,515  16.0  6.8  123.1 
2005 4,212  4,130  4,179  3,609  13.6  3.8  121.5 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on official trade statistics from the China Customs Administration and from 
UN COMTRADE data. 
Note: In the last three columns, the smaller the value, the greater the overlap. Value share is the sum of the shares 
of G-3 product lines for which China’s export shares are zero. A US$ 1 million cutoff is used in the second to the 
last column. 
 
We compute the values of the EDI for China and India (relative to the G-3 
































































1996 4,143 3,746 4,126  1,324 67.2  40.8  154.0 
1997 4,143 3,792 4,123  1,387 65.9  40.5  154.5 
1998 4,143 3,803 4,121  1,371 66.1  44.0  156.4 
1999 4,143 3,817 4,120  1,443 64.5  41.5  157.5 
2000 4,143 3,916 4,116  1,685 58.5  37.2  152.3 
2001 4,143 3,940 4,118  1,691 58.4  32.9  149.1 
2003 4,213 4,057 4,182  2,107 48.9  24.7  144.2 
2004 4,213 4,058 4,186  2,206 46.5  23.2  143.4 
2005 4,212 4,072 4,179  2,381 42.3  20.4  139.9 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on official trade statistics from UN COMTRADE data. 
Note: In the last three columns, the smaller the value, the greater the overlap. Value share is the sum of the shares 
of G-3 product lines for which India’s export shares are zero. A US$ 1 million cutoff is used in the second to the 
last column. 
 
Figure 4. A few features are worth noting. First, the dissimilarity index relative to the 
advanced economies has been declining for both China and India. For China, the 
dissimilarity index declined from 134 in 1996 to 122 in 2005. For India, it declined 
from 154 to 140 during the same period. Second, in contrast to the impression one 
gets from looking at the fraction of product lines that are common to China (or India) 
and the G-3 economies, this metric suggests that it is still premature to claim that 
China and France are exporting more or less the same bundle of goods. In fact, the 
value of the dissimilarity index (at 122 in 1995 for China) is a long way from 
consistency with an identical export bundle (i.e. a value of zero). Third, by this 
measure, India’s export dissimilarity score in 2005 was still greater than China’s in 
1995. This suggests that it may take more than a decade for India to catch up with 
China in terms of the export structure sophistication in manufactured goods.  
 

















Source: Authors’ calculations based on official trade statistics from the China 
Customs Administration and UN COMTRADE data.  
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3.  What Might Explain China’s Precocious Export Sophistication? 
 
While our calculation does not support the claim that China already has a similar 
export structure to France, Japan and other high-income countries, it shows a clear 
trend in that direction. Moreover, as Fontagne, Gaulier, and Zignago (2007) show, 
China’s export structure is already more similar to those of the high-income countries 
than to those of Brazil, Russia and middle-income countries. What could explain this 
precocious export structure sophistication? 
 
Using detailed trade data at the level of product, producer location, producer 
ownership, and customs type (i.e., processing trade or not), Wang and Wei (2007) 
provide some useful clues to what the question’s answer may be. As we do not have 
comparably detailed data for India, we are not able to conduct the same exercise for 
India. In this section, we summarize our methodology and some of the key findings of 
Wang and Wei (2007), and speculate over the implications for China. 
 
Some Qualitative Priors 
 
It is useful to think through some logical possibilities before we embark on a more 
rigorous analysis. First, the sophistication we have measured could be a statistical 
mirage due to processing trade. For example, both the United States and China may 
export notebook computers, but Chinese manufacturers may import the most 
sophisticated components of the computers, such as processors (CPUs) made by Intel 
or ADM in the United States. In such a case, Chinese producers may specialize in the 
unsophisticated stage of the production while the final product is classified as a 
sophisticated one. If one were able to classify a product further into its components, 
China and developed countries might be found to produce different components. That 
is, they might not compete directly with each other. In this scenario, there is very little 
for the developed countries to worry about. 
 
Second, as a variation of this scenario, China and the high-income economies may 
export the same set of product lines, but the two may export very different varieties 
within each product line, with China exporting varieties of much lower quality. The 
competition between the high-income economies and China, in this case, would be 
moderate. 
 
Third, on the other hand, the Chinese authorities, including governments at the 
regional and local levels, have actively promoted quality upgrading of China’s 
product structure, through tax and other policy incentives. A particular manifestation 
of these incentives is the proliferation of economic and technological development 
zones, high-tech industrial zones, and export processing zones around the country. 
Their collective share in China’s exports has risen from less than 6% in 1995 to about 
25% by 2005. These policy incentives could increase the similarity of Chinese exports 
to those of developed countries, although it is unlikely the most efficient thing for 
China to do (unless there is significant positive externality from learning by doing). If 
this is the primary driver for China’s rising sophistication, rather than the mis-
measurement induced by processing trade, then China may increasingly be competing 




Fourth, bearing on the two explanations, is the role of foreign invested firms in China. 
The share in China’s total exports produced by wholly foreign-owned firms and by 
Sino-foreign joint ventures has risen steadily over time, from about 31% in 1995 to 
more than 58% by 2006 (Table 3). These foreign-invested firms may choose to 
produce and export products much more sophisticated than those indigenous Chinese 
firms would. In this scenario, while China-made products may compete with those 
from developed countries, at least the profits from such production also contribute 
directly to the GNPs of developed countries. Besides this direct effect of foreign 
invested firms in China’s export upgrades, it is possible that the presence of foreign 
firms helps indirectly to raise the sophistication level of Chinese exports through 
various spillovers to domestic firms (Hale and Hong 2006). The above three possible 
explanations can reinforce each other, rather than being mutually exclusive. For 
example, a foreign-invested firm may engage in processing trade while located in a 
high-tech zone. 
 
Table 3:  Percentage Breakdown of China’s Exports by Firm Ownership, 1995-
2006 (%) 
 






1995 66.7  19.8  11.7  1.5  0.0 
1996 57.0  24.9  15.7  2.0  0.0 
1997 56.2  23.9  17.1  2.5  0.0 
1998 52.6  24.1  20.0  2.9  0.1 
1999 50.5  23.2  22.2  3.5  0.3 
2000 46.7  24.2  23.8  4.2  1.0 
2001 42.6  24.1  25.9  5.3  2.0 
2002 37.7  22.7  29.5  5.8  4.2 
2003 31.5  21.5  33.3  5.7  7.9 
2004 25.9  21.0  36.1  5.4  11.7 
2005 22.2  19.9  38.4  4.8  14.7 
2006 19.7  18.7  39.5  4.2  17.8 
Average 
1996-2004 
39.8 22.7  27.8  4.7  4.9 
 
Source: Authors’ computation based on official trade statistics from the China Customs 
Administration. 
 
To the best of our knowledge, direct evidence of the importance of these channels is 
provided only in Wang and Wei (2007).  A key finding is that neither processing trade 
nor foreign-invested firms play an important role in generating increased overlap in 
the export structures of China and the high-income countries. Instead, improvement in 
human capital and government policies in the form of tax-favored high-tech zones 
appear to have contributed significantly to the rising sophistication of China’s exports.  
 
Specification and Basic Facts 
 
To link China’s export structure dissimilarity to potential underlying factors, our 
strategy is to make use of variations across Chinese cities in both export  
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sophistication and its potential determinants. We consider several categories of the 
determinants, including the level of human capital, the use of processing trade, and 
the promotion of sophistication by governments through high-tech and economic 
development zones. 
 
To start with, Table 3 reports a breakdown of export value by exporter firm 
ownership. A number of features are worth noting. First, there has been a steady 
decline in the share of state-owned firms in China’s exports, from 66.7% in 1995 to 
19.7% in 2006. This reduction in the role of state-owned firms in exports mirrors the 
reduction of the state’s role in the economy in general. Second, foreign-invested firms 
(both wholly foreign-owned and Sino-foreign joint ventures) play a significant role in 
China’s exports. Their share in China’s exports has also increased steadily, from 
31.5% in 1995 to 58.3% in 2005. The role played by foreign firms in China’s exports 
is larger than that of such firms in most other countries with a population greater than 
10 million. Third, exports by truly private domestic firms are relatively small, though 
their share in China’s exports has also increased over time, from basically nothing 
until 1997, to 17.8% by 2005. Some of the growth in exports produced by domestic 
private firms has been achieved by a change in firm ownership. For example, when 
the laptop manufacturer Lenovo was first established, it was a partly state-owned 
firm. By 2003, it became a privately-owned firm. By now, it has added foreign 
investment, acquired the original IBM PC division, and exported some of its products 
under the IBM brand.  
 
Table 4:  Share of processing trade and policy zones’ production in China’s total 



















































1995 10.6  0  3.2  2.1  39.8  42.1  2.2 
1996 8.7  0  3.9  1.8  45.2  38.3  2.0 
1997 8.8  0  4.6  1.7  43.9  39.0  1.9 
1998 8.2  0  5.5  1.9  45.5  36.9  1.9 
1999 7.0  0  6.4  2.2  45.5  37.0  1.9 
2000 7.1  0  7.0  2.6  43.3  38.2  1.8 
2001 6.8  0.1  7.4  2.8  43.0  38.0  1.9 
2002 6.2  0.7  8.0  3.0  42.2  37.6  2.3 
2003 5.3  2.4  9.5  3.4  39.6  37.1  2.7 
2004 4.4  3.6  11.0  3.6  37.7  36.4  3.2 




6.3 1.3  8.0  2.8  41.7 37.4 2.4 
 
Source: Authors’ computations based on official trade statistics from the China Customs Administration. 
Note: 
a This category includes international aid, compensation trade, goods on consignment, border trade, goods 
for foreign contracted projects, goods on lease, outward processing, barter trade, warehouse trade, and entrepôt 




Table 4 reports a breakdown of China’s exports into processing trade, normal trade, 
and others according to exporters’ customs declarations. Processing exports come in 
three varieties: (a) those from export processing zones, (b) those from various high-
tech zones, and (c) those from outside any policy zones. Collectively, their share in 
the country’s total exports has increased from 43% (=0+3.2%+39.8%) in 1995 to 52% 
(=4.6%+11.8%+35.6%) in 2005. As we lack information on the share of processing 
exports for other countries, we cannot conduct a formal international comparison. Our 
conjecture is that very few developing countries would have a share of processing 
exports as high as China’s. On the other hand, we conjecture that a portion of China’s 
reported processing trade may be exaggerated due to some firms’ desire to evade 
tariffs on imported inputs that are actually used for domestic sale
2. 
 
Additional tables in Wang and Wei (2008) indicate that foreign-invested firms are 
dominant in processing exports, accounting for 100% of exports out of export 
processing zones, 95% of processing exports out of high-tech zones, and 67% of 
processing exports from the rest of China. State-owned firms account for the bulk of 
the remaining processing trade. Therefore, processing exports are mostly the domain 
of wholly and partly foreign-owned firms. The reverse is not true, in that foreign firms 
also engage in normal (i.e. “non-processing”) exports, accounting for 40% of non-
processing exports out of high-tech zones and 24% of normal trade outside of policy 
zones in 2004. 
 
For both wholly foreign-owned firms and Sino-foreign joint ventures, processing 
trade accounts for nearly 50% of exports produced. For state-owned firms and 
collectively owned firms, the share of processing exports in total exports produced is 
18% and 13%, respectively. Domestic private firms engage in comparatively little 
processing trade, producing less than 7% of their total exports in this category.  
 
China has established a number of special economic zones and areas where more 
incentive policies have been applied since 1979, as a part of its development strategy. 
Five special economic zones (SEZs) have been set up and are distinguished from 
other special economic areas. They include all of Hainan province, three cities 
(Shenzhen, Zhuhai, and Shantou) in Guangdong province, and a city (Xiamen) in 
Fujian Province. Other special economic areas are much smaller geographically, and 
classified as Economic and Technological Development Areas (ETDAs), Hi-
Technology Industry Development Areas (HTIDA), and Export Processing Zones 
(EPZs). Some of these special incentive zones and areas fall within the five SEZs. We 
will also refer to these incentive zones or areas as “policy zones”.    
 
Among these policy zones, ETDAs and HTIDAs are tax-favored enclaves established 
by central or local governments (with the approval of the central government) to 
promote development of sectors that could be considered “high and new tech” by 
some imperfectly-defined criteria. There are differences in theory between the two 
types of zones. In practice, however, the line between the two is often blurred. Which 
firms should go into which type of zone is somewhat arbitrary. As a result, we group 
them together in our discussion. With progressively more ETDAs and HTIDAs being 
established in the sample, their share in China’s exports has grown steadily, from only 
4.3% in 1995 to 15.4% in 2005 (sum of Columns 4 and 5 in Table 4). Since most 
                                                 
2 Fisman and Wei (2004) provided evidence of massive tariff evasion in China’s imports.  
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cities still do not have such zones, an unweighted average of their share in a city’s 
exports across all cities and years yields only 2%. 
 
Dedicated export processing zones (whose exports are exclusively in processing 
trade) were established starting in 2001 and are present in only 26 cities today. In 
national aggregate, only 4.6% of exports come from all the export processing zones 
taken together, by 2006 (Table 4, Column 3). On simple average (across cities and 
years), only 0.04% of exports come from EPZs. This means that most of China’s 
processing exports are produced outside an export processing zone. 
 
Foreign-invested firms dominate exports from EPZs and processing exports from 
high-tech zones in our sample period (99% and 95% respectively), and also took the 
lion’s share in processing trade outside those policy zones (67%). State-owned firms 
are the major players in normal exports, accounting for 58% of normal exports from 
high-tech zones and 63% of normal exports outside policy zones during our sample 
period. Relative to processing trade, collectively-owned and private firms also played 
an important role in China’s normal exports, accounting for 8.5% of normal exports 
from high-tech zones and 18% of exports originating outside policy zones.     
 
We relate the sophistication level of a local export structure to its plausible 
determinants including the role of processing trade, foreign investment, and local 
human capital. Formally, the econometric specification is given by the following 
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     (1) 
 
Where Ln(EDI) is the log of a dissimilarity index between a Chinese city’s export 
structure and the general export structure of the United States, Japan, and the 
European Union combined.  β1 – β6 are the coefficients to be estimated. μrft is the error 
term.  Other regressors and the sources of the data are explained in Appendix Table 1. 




The regression results are reported in Table 5. In the first four columns, the 
sophistication of a city’s export structure is measured by its similarity to that of the G-
3 high income countries on a year by year basis. As a robustness check, in the last 
four columns, the city’s export sophistication is measured against the export structure 
of the high-income countries in a fixed year (2004, the last year in our sample period). 





The coefficient on “export processing zone exports as a share of total city exports” is 
negative and significant, implying that exports from EPZs tend to be more similar to 
those of high-income countries than do typical Chinese exports. However, as a 
majority of Chinese cities do not have EPZs, this does not contribute much to 
explaining cross-city differences in export sophistication. 
 
The coefficients on the two variables describing exports from high-tech zones 
(“processing exports from high-tech zones” and “non-processing exports from high-
tech zones”) are negative and significant, implying that the high-tech zones do 
contribute to raising the export structure sophistication of China. Comparing the two 
point estimates, however, one sees that non-processing exports from the two types of 
high-tech zone, in fact, contribute more to raising export sophistication than do 
processing exports.  
 
The share of processing exports outside any policy zone is positive and significant: 
the more processing trade takes place outside any policy zone, the less sophisticated a 
city’s exports become. Taking the discussion of the last three coefficients together, we 
might argue that the processing trade (outside policy zones) is unlikely to have 
promoted similarities between the Chinese export structure and that of the high-
income countries. It is consistent with the intuition that processing trade in many areas 
of China, except in these policy zones, is relatively labor-intensive in nature. 
 
The coefficient on student enrollment in colleges or graduate schools as a share of a 
city’s non-agricultural population—a proxy for a city’s level of human capital—is 
negative and significant, consistent with the notion that a city with more skilled labor 
tends to have a more sophisticated export structure. In column 2 of Table 5, we use 
per capita gross city product (per capita GCP) as an alternative measure of a city’s 
level of human capital. This variable also produces a negative coefficient, indicating 
an association between more human capital and a more sophisticated export structure. 
 
In columns 3-4 of Table 5, we include measures of the presence of foreign firms in a 
city. The estimated coefficient for the share of exports by wholly foreign-owned firms 
in a city’s total exports is not significantly different from zero. Interestingly, the share 
of exports by joint-venture firms has a positive coefficient: the more a city’s exports 
come from joint-venture firms, the less the export structure resembles those of high-
income countries. These results suggest that foreign-invested firms in China are not 
likely to be directly responsible for the rising sophistication of China’s export 
structure, or at least not in a simple linear fashion (e.g. the more FDI, the more 
sophisticated China’s export structure will be).  
 
As we explained earlier, Columns 5-8 of Table 5 replicate the first four columns 
except that the left-hand-side variables are re-calibrated against the 2004 export 
structure of the G-3 economies. The qualitative results stay essentially the same. To 
summarize the key findings that emerge from the series of regressions in Table 5, we 
find that: 
 
(a)  Cross-city differences in human capital are linked to cross-city differences in 
the sophistication level of the export structure. A higher level of human 
capital, measured either by per capita GDP or by college and graduate school 




(b)  The high-tech zones are associated with more sophisticated export structure. 
The higher the share of a city’s exports coming out of high-tech zones, the 
more likely the city’s export structure resembles that of the G-3 high income 
economies. 
 
(c)  The export processing zones (EPZs) contribute to the rising sophistication of 
the export structure. However, since only a small fraction of the cities have 
any EPZs, they play a very small quantitative role in explaining the cross-city 
differences in export structure sophistication. 
 
(d)  Processing trade generally is not a major factor in explaining cross-city 
differences in export structure sophistication. This can be seen in two ways. 
First, for exports originating outside any policy zone (which represent the 
lion’s share of all exports) more processing trade is in fact associated with less 
similarity to the export structure of the high-income countries. Second, for 
exports from high-tech zones, those products that are classified in processing 
trade do not appear to overlap more with high income countries’ exports than 
do products classified in non-processing trade. 
 
(e)  After controlling for exports from major policy zones, foreign investment does 
not appear to play a major role in explaining cross-city differences in the 
sophistication level of their export structures. If anything, joint-venture firms 
may create some divergence between a city’s export structure and that of the 
high-income economies.  
 
These findings reject the views that the rising sophistication of China’s export 
structure is mostly generated by processing trade and/or foreign invested firms. At the 
same time, it confirms the importance of human capital and governmental policies in 
the establishment of the high-tech zones to promote the rising sophistication of 
China’s export structure. 
 
The specification used in Table 5 includes city fixed effects. This is the appropriate 
thing to do in a panel regression such as this. However, in order to make sure that the 
proposed explanatory variables—processing trade, foreign ownership, high-tech 
zones, human capital, etc.—collectively have enough explanatory power on their own 
to account for the observed cross-city differences in the export structure dissimilarity 
index, we have also run similar regressions without city fixed effects (the results are 
not reported here, to save space, but can be found as Appendix Table 8 in Wei and 
Wang 2008). The patterns on the signs of the coefficient estimates and the statistical 
significance are mostly the same as in Table 5. As important, the total R-squares in 
this set of regressions without city fixed effects are in the range of 66-68%. This 
suggests that much of the cross-city differences in export patterns are explained by the 





Table 5:  What Explains Cross-city Export Structure? Export Structure Dissimilarity between Chinese Cities and the G-3 Economies 
 
  Year-by-year benchmark  2004 benchmark 
















0.591*** Export Processing Zone Exports as a Share of 
Total City Exports 
















0.090*** Processing exports in High-tech Zones as a 
Share of Total City Exports  (0.018) (0.020) (0.018) (0.020) (0.020) (0.023) (0.020) (0.023) 
-0.087* -0.108**  -0.093**  -0.115** -0.087*  -0.116*  -0.092* -0.122**  Non-processing exports in High-tech Zones as a 
Share of Total City Exports  (0.045)  (0.053) (0.044) (0.053) (0.049) (0.061) (0.049) (0.061) 
0.005* 0.004  0.004  0.002 0.006* 0.004 0.005* 0.003  Processing exports outside economic zones as a 
Share of Total City Exports  (0.003)  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
-
0.225***   -
0.229***   -
0.309***   -
0.315***   Student Enrollment in Institutions of Higher 
Education as a Share of the City Non-
Agricultural  Population  (0.066)  (0.066)  (0.073)  (0.072)  
 -0.006**   -
0.007***   -
0.010***   -
0.010*** per capita GCP 
 (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003) 
-0.003** -0.003** -0.003** -0.003**  -0.003*  -0.003*  -0.003** -0.003**  Gross City Product (GCP)   (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
   0.001  0.004    -0.004  -0.000  Foreign-invested firms’share in city exports     (0.006)  (0.006)    (0.006)  (0.007) 
   0.010*** 0.010***    0.009**  0.009**  Joint venture firms’share in city exports     (0.004)  (0.004)    (0.004)  (0.004) 
City  Fixed  Effects  Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year  Fixed  Effects    Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Robust,  Cluster(city)  Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations  1981 1981 1981 1981 1981 1981 1981 1981 
R-squared  0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.97 0.98 0.97 
 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  15 
 
4.  Conclusion 
 
Are China and India’s exports increasingly competing head to head with those of 
high-income countries? To address this question, this chapter undertakes two tasks. 
The first part of the chapter compares the product structures of China and India’s 
exports with those of the G-3 economies (the United States, Japan, and the European 
Union). It finds that both emerging market giants have an export bundle that is 
becoming increasingly more similar to those of the high-income countries. However, 
by this metric, China is perhaps a bit more than ten years ahead of India.  
 
The second part of the chapter sifts through various potential determinants of the 
rising sophistication of Chinese exports, drawing on our recent research (Wang and 
Wei 2008). The list of potential determinants includes government incentives, the use 
of imported inputs, foreign invested firms, and improved human capital. The 
underlying methodology makes use of variations in the key variables across different 
cities in China. As we do not have access to comparable data for India, this exercise is 
not replicated for Indian exports. 
 
The estimation shows that, for the country as a whole, China’s export structure does 
increasingly resemble that of the advanced economies, and the unit values of its 
exports are also rising over time. If these patterns are generated entirely by the rising 
use of processing trade, then there may not be much genuine increase in the 
sophistication level of China exports. If there is a real increase in sophistication, 
where the increment comes entirely from foreign-invested firms in China, then the 
economic profit associated with the improved sophistication accrues to foreign 
economies rather than to China. Of course, the increased sophistication can also come 
from an improved level of local human capital, or government policies such as high-
tech policy zones set up specifically to promote the upgrading of the industrial 
structure. Regional variations in the use of processing trade, high-tech zones, and 
availability of skilled labor are used in this paper to assess the relative roles of these 
factors. 
 
The econometric analysis conducted in Wang and Wei (2008) provides evidence on 
the relative importance of the three channels:  
 
(1)  Cross-city differences in human capital are linked to cross-city differences in 
the sophistication of export structures. A higher level of human capital is 
associated with a more sophisticated export structure in Chinese cities. 
 
(2)  High-tech zones are associated both with more sophisticated export structures 
and with higher unit values. This means that the policy zones (especially 
ETDZs and HTIDZs) set up by the central and local governments may have 
worked to induce firms to upgrade their product ladder to a higher level than it 
otherwise have achieved. In other words, these policy zones may not only 
have promoted processing trade, but they may have promoted greater 
sophistication of China’s exports, too. 
 
(3)  The export processing zones (EPZs) contribute both to the rising 
sophistication of export structures and to rising unit values. However, since 
only a tiny fraction of cities have EPZs and since most of their exports come 16 
 
from foreign-invested firms, they do not contribute very much to explaining 
cross-city differences in export sophistication. 
 
(4)  Processing trade generally is not a major factor in explaining cross-city 
differences in export structure sophistication. This can be seen in two ways. 
First, for exports outside any policy zone (which comprise the lion’s share of 
China’s total exports, about 42% during our sample period) more processing 
trade is in fact associated with less similarity to the export structure of 
advanced countries. Second, for exports out of the high-tech zones, those 
products that are classified as processing trade do not appear to overlap more 
with advanced countries’ exports than do products associated with non-
processing trade.  
 
However, further analysis by Wang and Wei (2008) suggest that processing trade is 
significantly associated with higher unit values. How would one reconcile the findings 
on export structure and unit values? If most processing exports outside the policy 
zones are labor-intensive, a higher share will increase the dissimilarity of the export 
structure between the Chinese cities and G-3 advanced economies. However, 
processing exports could still be of higher quality (of more sophisticated varieties) 
than normal exports in the same product line, because of the use of high-quality 
imported materials in the former. In other words, processing trade moves China into 
producing and exporting more sophisticated varieties within a given product category, 
but not necessarily in those product categories that overlap heavily with the exports of 
the G-3 advanced economies
3.  
 
(5)  The export share of foreign-invested firms in a Chinese city does not appear to 
play a major role in explaining cross-city differences in the sophistication 
level of export structure. If anything, joint-venture firms may create some 
divergence between a city’s export structure and that of the advanced 
economies. However, after controlling for processing trade, both types of 
foreign-invested firms are found to be strongly associated with higher export 
unit values. Therefore, foreign investment is conducive to raising China’s 
within-product sophistication.  
                                                 
3 It is possible that the higher unit values associated with processing exports simply reflect higher costs 
of imported inputs as compared to domestically made inputs. This leaves open the question of 
whether processing exports generate more value-added when compared with normal exports that use 





Data on China’s exports at the HS 8-digit level (the most disaggregated level of 
classification made available by Chinese customs) are obtained from the China 
Customs General Administration. The database reports the geographic origin of 
exports (from more than 400 cities in China) policy zone designation (i.e. whether an 
exporter is located in any type of policy zone) firm ownership, and transaction type 
(whether an export is processing trade by customs declaration) for the period from 
1995 to 2005. 
 
Appendix Table 1.  Definition of Key Variables and data sources 
 
Dependent variables  Description  Data Sources 




irft rft s s abs =   EDI ∑ −  
 
Absolute export structure 
dissimilarity index 
Calculated by the 
authors from 6 digit HS 
level. Chinese City 
exports based on official 
China Custom Statistics. 
Data on US, EU15 and 
Japan exports download 
from WITS 
Explanatory variables    
GCPrt  Gross City Product (10,000 
yuans); note that this is a 
value added concept, making 
GCP conceptually similar to 
GDP. 
China City data, China 
data online 
PCGCPrt = 100 GCPr / POPr  per capita GCP  (yuan)   China  City  data,  China 
data online 
SKILLrt = 100 * (No. of College 
Students)rt /(non-agricultural 
population)rt   
Student Enrollment in 
institutions of higher 
education as a share of a 
city’s non-agricultural 
population 
China City data, China 
data online 
EPZ_sharerft  Export Processing Zone 
Exports as a Share of Total 
City Exports 
China Custom Statistics. 
High_tech_zone_processing_sharerft  Processing exports in the two 
High-tech Zones as a Share 
of Total City Exports  
China Custom Statistics 
High_tech_zone_nonprocessing_sharerft Non-processing exports in 
the two types of High-tech 
Zones as a Share of Total 
City Exports 
China Custom Statistics 
Processing_outside_anyzone_sharerft  Processing exports outside 
policy zones as a Share of 
Total City Exports 
China Custom Statistics 
Expfieshrft  FIE firm exports as share of 
Total City Exports 
China Custom Statistics. 
Expjonshrft  Joint venture firm exports as 
Share of Total City Exports 
China Custom Statistics 
expothshrft  Collective and Private firm 
exports as  Share of Total 
City Exports 
China Custom Statistics 
expsoeshrft  SOE firm exports as Share of 
Total City Exports 
China Custom Statistics 
 18 
 
We link this database with a separate database on Chinese cities, including per capita 
gross city product, population, college student enrollment and FDI data, from China-
data-online, managed by the China Data Center at the University of Michigan. 
Unfortunately, the coverage of the second database is more limited (240 cities from 
1996-2004). 
 
Note that a ‘city,’ in our sample, refers to a geographic unit that includes a metropolis 
and adjacent rural counties under the jurisdiction of the metropolitan government. 
 
Data on exports by the G-3 economies at the HS 6-digit level come from the United 
Nations’ COMTRADE database, downloaded from the World Integrated Trade 
Solution (WITS) site. We wish to focus on manufactured goods, not on natural 
resources, and therefore exclude the goods in HS Chapters 1-27 (agricultural and 
mineral products) and raw materials and their simple transformations (mostly at the 
HS 4-digit level) in other HS chapters. 
 



















1100 Beijing  CY    1996  1996  2001 
1200 Tianjin  CY    1996  1996  2001 
1301 Shijiazhuang      1996   
1303 Qinhuangdao    1996    2005 
1306 Baoding      1996   
1401 Taiyuan    2003  1996   
1502 Baotou      1997   
2101 Shenyang    1996  1996   
2102 Dalian    1996  1996  2001 
2103 Anshan      1996   
2201 Changchun    1996  1996   
2202 Jilin      1996   
2301 Harbin    1996  1996   
2306 Daqing      1996   
3100 Shanghai  CY    1996  1996  2001 
3201 Nanjing      1996  2004 
3202 Wuxi      1997  2003 
3204 Changzhou      1997   
3205 Suzhou    1996  1997  2001 
3206 Nantong    1996    2003 
3207 Lianyungang    1996    2004 
3211 Zhenjiang        2004 
3301 Hangzhou    1996  1996  2001 
3302 Ningbo    1996    2004 
3303 Wenzhou    1996     
3401 Hefei    2005  1996   
3402 Wuhu    1996    2003 
3501 Fuzhou    1996  1996   
3502 Xiamen  1995    1996  2002 
3601 Nanchang      1996   
3701 Jinan      1996   
3702 Qingdao    1996  1997  2004 


















3706 Yantai    1996    2001 
3707 Weifang      1996   
3710 Weihai      1996  2001 
4101 Zhengzhou      1996  2005 
4103 Luoyang      1997   
4201 Wuhan    1996  1996  2001 
4206 Xiangfan      1997   
4301 Changsha      1996   
4302 Zhuzhou      2000   
4401 Guangzhou    1996  1996  2001 
4403 Shenzhen  1995    1996  2002 
4404 Zhuhai  1995    1996   
4405 Shantou  1995       
4406 Foshan      1998   
4408 Zhanjiang    1996     
4413 Huizhou      1996   
4420 Zhongshan      1996   
4501 Nanning      1996   
4503 Guilin      1996   
4505 Beihai        2005 
4601 Haikou  1995    1996   
4602 Sanya  1995       
5000 Chongqing    2002  2002  2002 
5101 Chengdu    2001  1996  2001 
5107 Mianyan      1996   
5201 Guiyang      1996   
5301 Kunming      1996   
6101 Xi'an      1996  2004 
6103 Baoji      1997   
6104 Xianyang      2002   
6201 Lanzhou      1996   
6301 Xining    2005     
6501 Urumqi    1996  1997   
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